Status quo in Anbar is not "victory"

Rob Farley, who does great work on foreign policy and security issues at both Tapped and LGM, has an excellent analysis of the current situation in Anbar. The idea that some tribes in Anbar are sick of al Qaeda is hardly shocking, and while it's nice that they're not cooperating with foreign fighters, working with Sunni tribes on military operations is hardly an unmitigated win for the U.S. *or* Iraq itself. These are, after all, the same groups that we were fighting before we decided to join up with them. As Rob explains,

The US is currently enrolling in Iraqi police and military units tribesmen who were, ten months ago, part of the insurgency. The loyalty of such individuals can hardly be taken for granted; the tribal elite may decide, six months from now, that they are no longer pleased with the US and shift against us. Even if the tribal elites remain loyal, the alliance poses a larger problem for basic US war aims. The alliance with these tribes serves, necessarily, to strengthen them as political units . . . invariably weaken[ing] the central government. As the tribes are also among the least progressive and least interested in democracy of any Iraqi political constituencies, strengthening them also helps undercut efforts towards democratization.

I would even take it a step further: in addition to the potential for tribal leaders to take the money and run, it's not just that the tribes are illiberal, but there is a very real possibility that they could turn against the Iraqi government. Training and arming the disparate groups against each other in a burgeoning civil war is not a good strategy. NOT a good strategy.