This week included a deluge of criticism aimed at Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, starting on Monday when Senators Levin and Warner returned from a quickie two-day trip to Iraq and said that Maliki should be voted from office. Subsequent criticism came from the new National Intelligence Estimate, Ayad Allawi (the former PM who penned a WaPo op-ed that basically said, "Topple Maliki and put me back in power!), and, perhaps most bizarrely, a high-powered Republican lobbying firm apparently being paid by Allawi.
The attacks on Maliki are mostly misguided. While the critiques are true, they really describe the problems of the prime minister position more than any failure on the part of Maliki himself. This is just part of the four-year fantasy that if we just find the right guy to run Iraq all our problems will be solved.
I wrote a piece for the American Prospect on this topic over four months ago, and every word remains applicable today. An excerpt:
There are three major problems with the pattern of U.S. indecision, transitory support, and constant meddling in internal Iraqi political affairs over the last four years.
First, the approach distorts the American public's understanding of the conflict by perpetuating the absurd idea that Iraq can be fixed if we just get the right Iraqi leader in power. There is no Nelson Mandela waiting in the wings, no Ataturk -- not even a Yeltsin or a Nasser. The internal conflicts in Iraq, not to mention a constitution that essentially mandates proportional ethno-religious representation in parliament, currently preclude the ascendance of such a unifying leader. [...]
Second, such relentless meddling in political conflicts we do not fully understand ensures that neither Iraqis nor other regional powers can establish any reliable relationship with the United States. [...] American inconsistency therefore fuels unpredictable behavior in and around Iraq, seriously damaging military and diplomatic efforts. And for all of these difficulties, our careening policies in the region never seem to actually gain anything.
Finally, the constant search for the "right" policy or the "right" Iraqi leader epitomizes the "Quiet American" idea that the United States can -- and should -- affect everything everywhere. [...] Sometimes the best thing to do in a delicate and difficult political situation is to take a step back from the fray.
Allawi is not the answer. He has virtually no domestic constituency, no military or militia forces loyal to him to support security efforts, and he royally screwed things up last time he was in power. Recently Ambassador Crocker was asked about Allawi. His response? "Crocker, when asked about Allawi, said he only spoke to people who actually came to Iraq." Ouch.
The problems in Iraq, as anybody who follows them closely knows, are structural and political. They were not caused by nor can they be fixed by a single leader. And for the US, the worst result would be the double-whammy of further screwing up Iraq by installing a "non-sectarian" leader . . . followed by administration claims that we have to "give the new leadership a chance, not withdraw troops at such a crucial moment." I'm not saying Maliki is on his way out (there were similar rumblings in late winter/early spring about deposing him and he survived), but if he does go, it would likely be doubleplus ungood all around.







