My impression of the situation in Pakistan is similar to that of Matt Yglesias, who writes this morning, "I keep veering between a sense that since this Pakistan business is one of the most important things going on right now I should write about it, and a sense that there's no reason for me to play fake Pakistan expert." I share that perspective; on the other hand, I've also been reading as much as I can and talking to actual Pakistan experts, having greater access to this rare breed than the average news junkie, and I think there are a few clear elements amidst a general sea of uncertainty.
First, "President" Musharraf claims the declaration of a "state of emergency" in Pakistan -- which is for all intents and purposes an imposition of martial law -- is due to terrorist threat. This, by all credible accounts, is false. Musharraf is reacting to approaching elections, an impending supreme court decision on his role in the government, and the ascension of opposing political groups, highlighted by the return of former prime minister Benazir Bhutto. While there are certainly extremist elements in Pakistan, they're by no means a majority or a major threat to the military (and therefore Musharraf himself).
A persuasive (if scary) analogy is to the Shah in Iran, circa 1979, a comparison which Vali Nasr made yesterday but which people have been making for months. On that note, the idea that this was some big, out-of-nowhere surprise is also totally false. Foreign policy observers have been worrying about this for a while.
Unfortunately, according to WaPo, there's literally no one at the wheel with this issue:
"The problem is exacerbated by a dramatic drop-off in U.S. expertise on Pakistan. Retired American officials say that, for the first time in U.S. history, nobody with serious Pakistan experience is working in the South Asia bureau of the State Department, on State's policy planning staff, on the National Security Council staff or even in Vice President Cheney's office."
The article says "even in" the VP's office, of course, because that's where US foreign policy is run, so apparently it's the most important place to have experts.
Two more quick notes: First, there seems to be widely differing opinions on the nuclear issue. The administration is saying that there's no chance of nukes (or nuclear materials) getting out of Musharraf's control . . . but that's exactly what they'd say even if there was a concern about it, simply as a CYA measure in the wake of yet another foreign policy failure. My friends who know Pakistan well, *especially* those in the Middle East and subcontinent, have some concerns. My best understanding is that it's not an immediate problem, but one that could be should things take a turn for the worse.
Finally, the alliance of pro-democracy forces and violent religious extremists is, obviously, a complicated and worrying thing. The most vocal protesters thus far have been attorneys and judges committed to rule of law and . . . Islamic fundamentalists. Musharraf remains very popular among the middle class, which you might not expect given this paranoid crackdown, and his grip on the military is reportedly tight, so it's not like he's on the verge of being toppled. But it seems to be an issue of bend versus break: if he had given up some power, he probably could have maintained virtually the same level of control as before. Having refused to make any concessions, however, he's now facing a serious opposition and a fairly horrified international community.
Not good all around, and I'll continue to try to watch and synthesize as things develop.
