I've been closely following the situation in Iraq over the past day or so, and although I often downplay hysterics with regard to minor changes in political or military processes (in Iraq and elsewhere), this time the developments really could be a big deal. For nearly seven months, the militia loyal to Shia cleric and political leader Moqtada al-Sadr has observed a self-imposed ceasefire. Despite frequent analysis crediting the "surge" for reductions in violence, there's a strong correlation between this ceasefire and the drop in casualties. Along with a few other major factors (waning of ethnic cleansing, buying off insurgents in Anbar, shift in counterinsurgency strategy), the ceasefire had a big impact on the security improvements.
All of that, however, may evaporate in a hail of bullets if the current Sadrist "civil disobedience" campaign brings the simmering rift between rival Shia groups into sustained open conflict. One of the most frustrating things about mainstream Iraq analysis is that it tends to talk about worst case scenarios for leaving but best case for staying; well, there are some pretty bad possibilities for if we continue an occupation with no political strategy, and a full-blown Shia vs. Shia civil war is among the worst. For years the insurgency was overwhelmingly Sunni, which means the fighters were drawn from about 20% of the population. The Shia, on the other hand, are around 60% of the country. The problems are obvious and significant.
And, of course, this development was predictable -- and predicted. I've been warning about antagonizing Sadrists unnecessarily, as have others -- Eric Martin is one of many Iraq observers who saw this coming, and he has a comprehensive rundown of the history here. Bottom line, this is something that could change the dynamic considerably after a period of security improvements. For the millionth time, without a political solution, things will ultimately continue to get worse, not better.
