A while ago I wrote about Matt Duss being one of the most insightful and important emerging progressive voices on Iraq and national security, and much to the benefit of progressive infrastructure and wonkery, he's ended up with a job at the Center for American Progress, working for a special election-based offshoot of ThinkProgress and adding his substantial brain power to a place that already has some of the best thinkers on Iraq (Brian Katulis) and the military (Larry Korb).
Matt continues to do a tremendous job breaking through the spin on Iraq issues especially, and his recent post on Sadr gets to the heart of US strategic failures when it comes to the politics of Iraq and its neighbors. As he explains in a recent Wonk Room post:
The Bush administration has consistently tried to blame outside actors for violence in Iraq in order to avoid facing the unpleasant truth that the U.S. occupation is opposed by a substantial majority of the population who the U.S. is ostensibly there to support. In seeking to defend a continued U.S. presence in Iraq, the administration and its supporters have drawn a deeply distorted picture of the political struggles currently taking place within various Iraqi communities.
To put it simply, the U.S. is opposing Sadr because he opposes the U.S. occupation, and the U.S. is supporting ISCI because ISCI supports the occupation. As Brian Katulis and I noted in an op-ed several weeks ago, the irony of this strategy is that it has allied the United States with Iran’s primary proxy in the Iraqi government, against what is arguably the most potent nationalist political force in the country.
As a result of this myopic strategy, the US continues to contort itself when it comes to an actual political effort in Iraq. And of course this isn't some intellectual exercise; the results of such continued failures are borne by the deaths of hundreds of thousands and the suffering of millions more.
There is a persistent myth that Senator McCain is a credible voice on international affairs. As I've written before, the Senator does seem to have a grasp of *military* affairs, but that doesn't extend to any kind of foreign policy expertise, and his latest claims of multilateralism fall flat when compared to his actual policies and previous statements.
My colleagues Ilan Goldenberg and Max Bergmann of the National Security Network do the important work of going through McCain's speeches and statements and debunking the idea that he will offer anything different from the current (and disastrous) Bush administration approach to global affairs. Ilan and Max put it perfectly:
Only a press corps so enamored with McCain could imagine that one of the staunchest supporters of the Iraq War would be capable of breaking with the current administration's unilateral adventurism. Despite his conciliatory rhetoric, McCain's hawkish views, and his long history of castigating allies who do not agree with him, leave little reason to believe that when it comes to restoring America's image, credibility, and alliances, he would be much different than George W. Bush. A brief look at these four crucial policy areas explains why.
This is a meme that needs to be corrected in its infancy, and the piece does a great job of patiently going through the reality of McCain's views. The whole thing is well worth a read.
This NYT article on Iraq today is a good example of why it's so frustrating to try to follow news on Iraq through corporate media. Michael Gordon, who does some really good stuff on Iraq and often seems to fully understand the intricacies of the conflict, delivers up what reads like the stenography for which reporters are so often criticized by experts in various fields. In this case, the Bush administration is once again accusing Iran of causing problems in Iraq, this time by reportedly bringing in Hezbollah (an Arab, Lebanon-based Shia group formed to fight Israel and now a significant political and military force in Lebanon) officials to train Iraqi militia members. This is part of a continuing story in which the US blames problems in Iraq on nefarious neighbors, but anything is possible, so it's worth looking at the details of the report.
Or at least it would be if there *were any details* in the report. Most critically, it's important to note that there are many militias in Iraq. There's a (US-supported) Sunni militia in western Iraq (Anbar province), and in addition to several smaller tribal and political party-affiliated militias, the two major Shia political groups, ISCI and Sadrists, both have armed elements (the Badr Corps and the Mahdi Militia, respectively). So one would think an important detail of the story would be . . . which militia we're accusing Iran of training? Especially because the US has essentially come out in support of ISCI and its Badr Corps, as they are the main element keeping Prime Minister Maliki in power. Could the administration flacks be so cynical as to accuse Iran of training a "militia" that we tacitly support, and that is closely allied with our good buddy Maliki?
I suppose it's possible that the militia in question is the Mahdi Militia, but with Iran supposedly backing away from support of Sadrists, that seems less likely, and since the US opposes Mahdi so strongly, why not just say so if that's the case? The whole thing is very strange, and it's opaque to an extent that it's very suspicious.
Over at the Washington Independent, reporter Spencer Ackerman has been writing, among other things, a series on counterinsurgency. Today he takes a particularly interesting approach to the subject, writing about how the rise of Shia Islamist leader Muqtada al-Sadr in Iraq has been largely due to Sadrists adopting the type of approach lauded by counterinsurgency doctrine. The thing about counterinsurgency is that it's really just a military way of saying that *somebody* has to provide government-type services -- security, education, health, economic, etc -- and in times of conflict, whichever group can do that tends to gain legitimacy and support. In Iraq, several parties have tried to do this with varying success, and Sadr has been among the most effective. As Ackerman explains,
The principles of counterinsurgency are diverse, but they could be summed up as methods of warfare used to draw a civilian population's political and personal allegiance away from a guerrilla force. A counterinsurgent force seeks to coordinate military and civilian methods to offer both material and ideological incentives to a population so it will support a government and reject that government's enemies.
Currently, the U.S. military and its civilian associates have launched a "population protection" strategy to defend Baghdad residents against sectarian and criminal gangs; to promote competent and responsible governance at the provincial as well as national levels; to jump start commerce; and to provide social services like education health care and sanitation. But in the areas under his control, Sadr provides all these things -- and does so better than the Iraqi government.
And rather than recognize these facts as they are, the US seems to vacillate between condescending to Sadrists in an attempt to placate them and openly trying to eradicate the group. We underestimate the power of popular movements to our own peril, and while I find many of Sadr's beliefs and goals extraordinarily distasteful, he's not leaving the picture anytime soon.
While right-wing pundits furiously try to spin Rev. Wright's comments as speaking for anyone other than Rev. Wright, it's vital that progressive observers and commentators remember that their machine will do anything -- anything -- to confuse people and divert attention from the failures of conservative governance. On the economy, on values, on social policy, and, perhaps most of all given the current situation in Iraq, on foreign affairs.
Our policies in Iraq -- not to mention places like Pakistan, Indonesia, Somalia, Iran, North Korea -- make America and the world a more dangerous place. Expert upon expert and report after report say so, and they're correct. The right wing wants to tie this common-sense argument to controversial figures so they can marginalize ideas along with individuals, and it's a smear tactic that can be devastating if people don't stand up and identify it for what it is. They're not making substantive critiques, they're using the politics of destruction and distraction.
After five years of war in Iraq, with constant reports coming out about letting terrorists escape in Afghanistan, failing to support non-proliferation in Pakistan, and neglecting the peace process while simultaneously inflaming countries in the Middle East, America will not be fooled by conservative claims that the US is doing just fine in foreign policy. Obviously our mistakes, historical and recent, do not justify the unacceptable and unforgivable targeting of civilians by terrorist actions, and people understand that -- so when right-wing talking heads try to paint a position shared by the majority of Americans as soft on terror, or self-hating, or some other such slander, they do so because they have no ideas about how to improve our country's security other than to lash out (preferably at the wrong people and places, it seems). Wanting to improve our foreign policy -- and our nation more generally -- isn't a lack of patriotism, but rather its highest form.
I don't believe it's in the American character to bully, and I mean that in terms of macro policies as well as in the micro political sense. But there will always be bullies, and they won't fight fair. We preserve our dignity and our ideology by pushing back strongly and honestly, and we can't sell out our ideas simply because they are sometimes adopted and warped by individuals who occasionally find themselves with a megaphone. The media won't help us, of course; nothing gets the media giddy like a lefty who doesn't "properly" self-censor. But we can't be distracted, we can't accept the right when it frames mainstream ideas through controversial individuals, and we must constantly remind Americans -- as well as ourselves -- that the country is moving steadily in our direction, even (perhaps especially) on difficult, personal, emotional issues. And in that evolving discussion and political movement, we must not let others tell us what we believe. We're right on foreign policy, on education, on health care, on jobs, on individual rights, on the environment, and more. We shouldn't let anyone turn those ideas into caricature, and we damn sure shouldn't caricature ourselves in response to smears and lies.
There are, of course, human costs to Americans from the war in Iraq, and we don't hear enough about them. We hear even less, though, about the human costs to Iraqis in Iraq. The brilliant and talented Ann Friedman helps to fill that vast void with a piece highlighting the importance of hearing about what it's like on the ground -- that is, not just from a political perspective, but from a personal one. As she says:
The news outlets that still report from Iraq rarely publish accounts of daily life there. Rarer still are narratives from outside the confines of the Green Zone. Sure, we get snippets of information from Iraqi reporters working with Western journalists, but most of the time, Iraqis' voices come to us in the form of react-quotes after a marketplace bombing or sectarian uprising. We don't see what it's like for Iraqis to walk home from the scene of the violence, then make dinner, then put their kids to bed. We lack the humanizing power of detail.
Democracy is founded on the will of the people, and for that will to be true and just, it must be informed. People have the right and the responsibility to know the facts about the actions of our nation and its leadership, and the realities of Iraq are a critical -- and too often overlooked -- element of who and what we are and want to be as a nation. Not to mention, y'know, a huge part of the day to day story.
John Boonstra over at UN Dispatch writes about the still overlooked and under-reported continuing catastrophe in Darfur. President Bush's recent statements continue the administration's pattern of cynicism and misdirection on Darfur, and the detrimental effects are real and they are horrifying.
The alternative to a slow-deploying UN force was never sending U.S. troops into Darfur; this option was simply never on the table. [...] No, the alternative to U.S. troops in Darfur was, is, and will continue to be putting an effective UN peacekeeping force on the ground there, which the U.S. has been in the most opportunistic position to ensure. By failing to provide more robust support for UN peackeeping, to invest a deeper commitment in Sudan's tortured peace processes, and to exert more concerted pressure on Sudan and its enablers, the U.S. has consistently watched opportunities for peace and protection in Darfur sail by.
As John says, the false dichotomy presented by the administration on Darfur is simply misdirection. The US could use its considerable ability -- which, despite repeated foreign policy screwups, remains -- to make things better, but instead there's a lot of foot-dragging and blaming all sorts of other factors and elements. History will not be kind.
Another new low for the oil industry and as we have come to expect, the Bush administration. Let the damned oil companies pay the compensation to the victims families if they want the business so badly but it is sickening to watch the oil industry dictate our foreign policy. So tell me who loves America and who hates America?
One by one, top executives of American oil companies met privately over the last year with Libya’s leader, Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi, often in his signature Bedouin tent, as they lined up contracts allowing them to tap into the country’s oil reserves.
But now, the new allies are working Capitol Hill, trying to weaken a law that threatens those deals. The Libyan government, once a pariah, and the American oil industry have hired high-profile lobbyists, buttonholed lawmakers and enlisted help from the Bush administration, all in an effort to win an exemption from a law that Congress passed in January that is intended to ensure that victims of terrorist attacks are compensated.
Greg Mitchell, of the invaluable Editor and Publisher, writes about an under-reported aspect of the war in Iraq. A recent report indicates that around 20% of suicides nationwide are current or former military personnel. Other than being at least some indication of the toll inflicted on someone who is trained to be able to kill others, it's an indictment of how our government takes care of the men and women who serve in the armed forces.
As Mitchell explains, non-combat deaths in Iraq are often vaguely reported, and when they're possible suicides, it's often local news outlets that take the lead in investigating. And the problem is significant and apparently worsening:
A rise in suicides among soldiers serving in the military has alarmed Pentagon planners and members of Congress as the war in Iraq enters its sixth year. An Army report produced last year found the rate of suicides among soldiers deployed in Iraq from 2003 to 2006 was almost 40 percent higher than the military's average suicide rate. An update of the Army's Mental Health Advisory Team report released in March found suicide rates for soldiers in 2007 remained "above normal Army rates."
I spend a lot of time talking about the political implications of foreign policy in general and Iraq in particular; it's also vital, though, to keep a level eye on the human costs. And they are seemingly endless.
Followers of Muqtada al-Sadr, an anti-American cleric who has massive support from Iraqi Shia, are part of a popular nationalist movement, committed to a united Iraq, relative independence from Iran, an end to US occupation, and conservative religious government. Needless to say, I personally think many Sadrist goals and actions are noxious. I also recognize, however, that there are a limited number of players in Iraq with real support; Sadr is one of them, and he continues to prove that he has at least some control over his putative followers ... many of whom are armed to the teeth.
So when our Secretary of State engages in schoolyard bullying, taunting the leader of millions of (armed) Iraqis, many of whom are actively engaged in the political process, it's a slap in the face not just to a massive popular movement in a country we're occupying, but in the face of the troops who are on the ground simultaneously trying to work with and/or fight against Sadrists. It's yet another "Bring 'em on" moment from an administration that seems to have made an art of underestimating and misunderstanding the enemy.
Again, I have no affection for Sadr, and I know better than most the result of the work of him and his followers. Let's take a look, though, at the person Secretary Rice calls a coward: Throughout Saddam's reign, Sadr's family was one of very few religious families not to leave the country. For their troubles, the family was rewarded with murder after murder after murder. Sadr's father was killed by Saddam. So were two of his brothers. So was his father in law. This is not a guy who has avoided the effects of violence.
If we're serious about democracy, we have to be serious about dealing with people who are popular, even if we don't like them. General Petraeus made engagement with Sadrists a high priority, and it's not clear why we've now gone 180 degrees. But needless provocation has no military or political benefit, and it should be beneath the highest-ranked diplomat in the nation.
General Petraeus, commander of US forces in Iraq, and US Ambassador to Iraq Ryan Crocker just spent two days on the Hill testifying before various Congressional committees. The spinning and misdirection required by members of this administration to make their policies appear even minimally rational continues to astound, and this latest round of dog-and-pony show didn't change that in the slightest.
It's unbelievably frustrating and depressing for those of us who closely follow this stuff to watch two well-educated, highly competent, patriotic Americans sit before Congress and the American public and dissemble, either for political reasons or because they simply don't have an accurate understanding of the situation. Petraeus said he wouldn't consider reinstating the surge, which flies in the face of administration claims that troop levels are determined on the ground (if we won't raise troop levels if "necessary" and won't reduce them even after these alleged security gains, what the hell determines the force structure?), and Crocker pretended that Iran isn't the main supporter of the political/militia group propping up our main man in Baghdad (ISCI/Badr and Maliki, respectively), just as two examples.
There were some good questions, and Senators Webb, Biden, Obama, and Clinton all demonstrated facility with complex issues, and even House members, usually less incisive than their Senate colleagues simply because they have fewer staffers to write questions and prep responses, did a good job. I mean, ultimately it isn't that hard to ask tough questions, considering how intellectually bankrupt the administration approach continues to be. But I doubt the past two days changed anything -- Republicans largely screwed up the facts and called Americans with doubts about the war unpatriotic, while Democrats tried again and again to get honest answer to reasonable questions, mostly to no avail, all as per the usual -- and since all of these things are mostly pre-planned and scripted, a continuation of status quo was predictable (and inevitable) anyway. And round and round we go.
By the way, Mark E. Rosenberg, 32 years old, of Miami Lakes, Florida, died yesterday in Baghdad from wounds suffered when his vehicle hit a roadside explosive device. He's one of 18 US troops who have been killed in the past four days alone, the deadliest such stretch since last summer.
After repeated mendacity about the (virtually nonexistent) relationship between Iran and al Qaeda, Senator McCain once again demonstrated his lack of foreign policy abilities today. During the course of the hearings with Ambassador Crocker and General Petraeus, he implied that al Qaeda is a Shia group, before lamely trying to recover with "or Sunnis or anybody else" as an appropriate label for the group.
His lack of knowledge of the political dynamics of a war we're now five years (and 4,000 lives) into is embarrassing, especially considering he's running on that as his main strength. I mean, even if he didn't know it before, shouldn't he, y'know, take the time to learn it now?? And if not, shouldn't the press occasionally mention the fact that he appears to have no idea what he's talking about?
Just for fun, check out what Michael Ledeen, hugely influential (close ties to the White House, resident scholar at AEI, contributing editor to National Review, etc etc) neoconservative foreign policy expert (er, "expert") had to say exactly a week ago about the situation in Iraq:
A lot of the coverage revolves around the colorful figure of Moqtada al Sadr, as if he were calling some of the shots in Baghdad and Basra, but those stories are anachronistic. Mookie is no longer a major player in these events. . . . Today, on the most reliable accounts, most Iraqi Shi’ites (and Sunnis, for that matter) despise the Iranian regime, blame it for most of the violence, and are fighting Iranians and their proxies throughout the land. . . . Democracy works its magic, even in the Middle East, and Maliki wants to keep his job. Right now, that requires him to fight the Iranian-sponsored militias.
This is all -- all! -- absolutely and thoroughly ridiculous, and reflects such a contradictory, dumbass understanding of the realities in Iraq that I wondered if it was an early April Fools joke. Any sentient observer of Iraq would know all those statements are wrong, but the piece is particularly notable because it was disproved virtually in its entirety just days after being posted last week.
First of all, and most importantly, the militia that keeps Maliki in power, the Badr Corps, is the single most Iran-connected organization in Iraq. Iran trained and funded Badr, an Iranian-based expat group, for years while Saddam was in power; by contrast, Sadr has a relatively tenuous relationship with Iran because he and his family stuck around in Iraq throughout Saddam's reign and because he's more of an Iraqi nationalist than Iran would like. The idea that Maliki is going around fighting Iranian influence is simply ludicrous.
Further, despite Ledeen's confident predictions of a Sadrist wipeout, Maliki and the Iraqi Army (if that's what we want to call essentially a bunch of deputized and uniformed Badr members) basically lost the battles in Basra and Baghdad, both from tactical and PR perspectives. And who brokered the truce that ended the fighting? Iran! The same nation Ledeen claimed was fomenting the violence. This is a guy with huge influence and a significant readership/following, and his position in the world would be hilarious if the effects weren't, y'know, the deaths of thousands and thousands and thousands of people.
Democratic presidential candidate Barack Obama has won the endorsement of one of his party's top foreign policy figures, Lee Hamilton, who hails from Indiana, home to one of the next crucial primary votes.
Hamilton, a former U.S. House member who co-chaired the commission that investigated the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks and headed the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, said he was impressed by Obama's approach to national security and foreign policy.
``I read his national security and foreign policy speeches, and he comes across to me as pragmatic, visionary and tough,'' Hamilton said in an interview. ``He impresses me as a person who wants to use all the tools of presidential power.''
It's been one of those times recently. I feel like for days I've been reading nonstop about war, political infighting, bullies, violence, and general internets stupidity. Now, there are a lot of unhappy things going on, and many of them deserve -- need! -- attention. It's also true, however, that the onslaught can get overwhelming, and there is good news out there, even if sometimes you have to search to find it. It certainly makes me feel better to give some attention to uplifting stuff, so without further ado, a few recent stories that are, each in their own way, a nice break from a tough spate of news:
In the large-scale, saving the planet category we have a new, three-year, $300 million campaign to mobilize Americans on climate change. God dag! Led by Al Gore and the Alliance for Climate Protection, the effort is reportedly one of the most ambitious and well-funded public advocacy operations in history. It will apparently attempt to match awareness with actual political/legislative action, and is being timed to coincide with the election. I don't write about climate very much because I simply am not an expert on the issues, but it affects just about everything -- including my pet issues of foreign policy and national security, eventually -- and this looks to be a great project.
In international news, last week Pakistan's parliament elected its first woman Speaker. Independent of the overall record of the role/treatment of women in the nation, it's always great to see barriers being broken, and for a country that has already had a female prime minister, this is another important milestone. Dr. Mizra is no token, either; a three-time rep, she was elected by an overwhelming margin -- 249 to 70.
The problem of skyrocketing foreclosures can hardly be spun as good news, but in the face of tragedy and difficulty, many organizations are stepping up to help, and it's in these under the radar circumstances that sometimes important efforts can get overlooked. Which is why the Humane Society effort to make sure that people who lose their homes don't lose their furry friends as well deserves a mention. With families struggling to keep and feed their pets in the face of increasing financial difficulty, this new grant program should do some real good. After my longtime canine companion passed earlier this year, I set up a recurring donation to HSUS, and I'm tremendously glad some of that contribution will go to this initiative.
Finally, in a hilarious "damn the man" vein, I include this for the ingenuity (and without any particular comment on the politics of makeup or schools or whatever): a creative -- and apparently scientifically brilliant -- group of high school girls were irritated with a school ban on nail polish, so they invented a kind that you can see outdoors but not indoors. Some chemical reaction far beyond my ability to comprehend makes the polish bright red outside and nearly invisible/transparent inside. I want some!
Obviously lots of news that sucks is still important to be aware of. I know -- I focus on Iraq, for goodness sake. And good stuff is hard to find; it took me a couple hours to find just these few nuggets! But there ya go. Every day is a new day, with new challenges but also new good, and all that. Hope y'all enjoy.
There has been a lot of commentary about how confusing the situation in Iraq has been over the past week or so. While there are some unanswered questions -- precisely how much influence the US had on the operational decision, how much control Sadr has over some elements of the militia, etc -- the basics seem pretty straightforward, albeit kind of a disaster.
After months of US and Iraqi Army tensions with Sadrist forces (a.k.a. Mahdi Militia) despite a tenuous ceasefire, increasing anger from Sadrists against Sadr's perceived passivity toward the US, and with provincial elections looming, Sadrists started making noise about ending their months-long ceasefire. At the same time, Prime Minister Maliki, former Sadr ally who has since become a rival due to SCIRI (a competing Shia party) support, decided to exercise some power in Basra, the southern province of Iraq that has the vast majority of the country's oil. The objectives of this move included reducing Sadrist power in advance of this fall's scheduled provincial elections, making the Iraqi Army more loyal to Maliki, and demonstrating to the US that the central government is on a path to self-sufficiency. At least, that was the theory.
In reality, Maliki (et al, including, it seems, US officials) drastically misjudged his ability to project power in Basra against the Mahdi Militia. As it turns out -- and I know you'll be shocked to hear this -- it's tough to fight an indigenous force that is highly motivated, knowledgeable about the battle terrain (especially in an urban environment), and doesn't rely on a strict hierarchical command and control structure. Who knew! I don't know how many times this lesson needs to be learned, but apparently Maliki didn't even take it from the difficulty the US has had in his own country. For another regional example that I think is a relatively close analogy, compare the Israeli operation in Lebanon last summer -- in that case, too, a state-based army drastically underestimated the ability of a militia to defend its own territory in the streets and alleys, leading to a humiliating operation.
And regardless of whatever you read about Sadr suing for peace, this absolutely was a humiliation for Maliki. Sadr doesn't appear to be giving up a single thing, and he never wanted an all-out fight (hence the ceasefire in operation since August). Sadr got to test out his fighters, see who was loyal and who was rogue, and then his forces held their own in the battle -- and as we all know by now, if you're attacking and not winning, you're losing. Then Iran got fed up with the skirmishing in its sphere of influence and told everybody to shut it down . . . so they did! The agreement to stop major fighting was brokered by Iranians, with Sadrists and members of Maliki's government essentially undermining him by agreeing to what is essentially a return to the status quo.
So after all the talk of this vital and determinative operation, it looks like the only thing that changes is an increasing intra-Shia rift, a weakened Maliki, and strengthened Sadr and Iran. This huge operation mounted against Sadr, he it doesn't look like he lost anything. Maliki -- and the US -- played this badly, and made greater internal violence more likely going forward, and for basically unnecessary (and political, rather than security) reasons.
Michael O'Hanlon, expert on everything and embarrassment to foreign policy professionals everywhere, regularly pumps out vacuous op-eds on the pages of, well, every major paper you can think of. His latest Washington Times gem, though, is particularly special, and includes this treasure:
The Iraqi Security Forces are surely better than before. But with memories of Iraq's intense civil war of 2006 and early 2007 still very fresh, it is doubtful they have gone far enough towards establishing national rather than sectarian loyalties.
That's a relief! I was worried that the past few days demonstrated the continuation and complication of an internal civil war, but apparently it's just a few little aftershocks of that ugly civil war that ended a year ago.
He also says we should send "at least modest numbers of American troops southward" into Basra. Not sure which side he wants us to take in that civil war . . . I mean, post-conflict zone.
I've been closely following the situation in Iraq over the past day or so, and although I often downplay hysterics with regard to minor changes in political or military processes (in Iraq and elsewhere), this time the developments really could be a big deal. For nearly seven months, the militia loyal to Shia cleric and political leader Moqtada al-Sadr has observed a self-imposed ceasefire. Despite frequent analysis crediting the "surge" for reductions in violence, there's a strong correlation between this ceasefire and the drop in casualties. Along with a few other major factors (waning of ethnic cleansing, buying off insurgents in Anbar, shift in counterinsurgency strategy), the ceasefire had a big impact on the security improvements.
All of that, however, may evaporate in a hail of bullets if the current Sadrist "civil disobedience" campaign brings the simmering rift between rival Shia groups into sustained open conflict. One of the most frustrating things about mainstream Iraq analysis is that it tends to talk about worst case scenarios for leaving but best case for staying; well, there are some pretty bad possibilities for if we continue an occupation with no political strategy, and a full-blown Shia vs. Shia civil war is among the worst. For years the insurgency was overwhelmingly Sunni, which means the fighters were drawn from about 20% of the population. The Shia, on the other hand, are around 60% of the country. The problems are obvious and significant.
And, of course, this development was predictable -- and predicted. I've been warning about antagonizing Sadrists unnecessarily, as have others -- Eric Martin is one of many Iraq observers who saw this coming, and he has a comprehensive rundown of the history here. Bottom line, this is something that could change the dynamic considerably after a period of security improvements. For the millionth time, without a political solution, things will ultimately continue to get worse, not better.
